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ABSTRACT
The study of regional integration has become an
essential topic of research in modern International Relations.
Regional cooperation is the fundamental step leading towards
regional integration. This thesis, using the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as the case
study, argues that political cooperation through elite rapport
is a pre-condition for the success of regional cooperation.
The South Asian case demonstrates that fruitful regional
cooperation depends upon the presence of elite rapport.

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

INTRODUCTION

South Asia, cut off from the rest of the Asian landmass by the Himalayan, Karakoram, Sulaiman and the Hindukush
mountain ranges, constitutes a distinctive geographic
region.

The countries of this region share common

historical, cultural and linguistic ties.

The common

heritage of colonial rule continues to shape South Asian
politics.
Modern South Asia faces what at the surface seems to be
insurmountable challenges rising from rampant poverty,
rapidly growing populations, unemployment and low economic
growth which are compounded by the presence of domestic
conflicts rising primarily from secessionist movements.

The

South Asian region accounts for nearly 20 percent of the
world*s population occupying only 3.3 percent of the earth’s
surface area.1
In December 1985, the leaders of seven South Asian
states convened for an unprecedented Summit at Dhaka, where
they unanimously adopted a Charter for regional cooperation

xNirijan M.Khilnani, "India*s Political and Economic
Policies Towards Her Neighbors,** Round Table 301 (January
1987): 53.
2

in South Asia.

After nearly five years of discussion and

debate at the bureaucratic level, the leaders of Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
formally launched the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), to promote cooperation to accelerate
the development of the South Asian region.

The birth of the

SAARC gave rise to hopes that this organization would
ultimately attenuate regional friction in South Asia, as
well as promote development.
The increasing awareness of the interdependence of
states has led to the development of the concept of regional
cooperation and the creation of a number of regional
organizations in different parts of the world.

Most states

of the world have realized the importance of cooperation
with other states in similar conditions in a particular
area.2

The formation of the European Community (EC)

popularized the concept of regional economic cooperation.
This growing faith in regionalism was further vitalized by
the growth of a number of regional bodies like the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Organization
of African Unity (OAU).

In Asia, the relative success of

the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) acted as catalysts in the
efforts to promote cooperation among the South Asian

2Atiur Rahman, Political Economy of SARC (Dhaka:
University Press Ltd., 1985), 4-5.
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states.
South Asia, the region of intermittent border conflict,
internal tensions and dubious bilateral relations since the
end of colonial rule, had long been the only region in the
world without a "rudimentary regional organization.1,3 The
formation of the SAARC in 1985, raised hopes, especially
among the regional intellectuals that this institution would
help to resolve the longstanding, bitter regional disputes
in South Asia.

However, the SAARC has not been able to live

up to these high expectations.
The SAARC at present is following the guidelines of the
functionalist methods of regional integration.4 The
principle belief underlying the functionalist approach
adopted by the SAARC is that cooperation in economic and
other so-called apolitical fields will promote cooperation
among the member states and create a suitable atmosphere for
the solution of the long-standing political conflicts within
the region.

No provision has been made for the discussion

of political disputes, which for all practical purpose, have
been excluded from the scope of the SAARC.

Collective self-

reliance of the region at large based on the promotion of
mutual trust, amity and peaceful coexistence is the primary
3Imtiaz Bokhari, "South Asian Regional Cooperation:
Progress, Problem, Potential and Prospects," Asian Survey
Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 371 citing Bharat Wariavwala,
"Timid Search for Status," Seminar No. 256 (December 1980):
22.
4See SAARC Charter (Appendix A ) .
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objective of the SAARC.
However, the present political discord in the region
makes the concept of regional cooperation for economic
development more an idealistic concept than a feasible one.
In most third world states, and especially among the South
Asian states, politics reigns supreme over economics.
seems to be the former that molds the latter.

It

In South

Asia, the process of nation-building continues and socio
economic forces remain comparatively underdeveloped.

Hence,

political forces, nationality, sovereignty and strategic
considerations, continue to be the primary forces guiding
the destiny of the seven SAARC members.
Partha S. Ghosh argues that an indispensable element of
regional cooperation is mutual rapport among elites of the
states, which is practically absent in South Asia.5 The
all-important presence of a "political will" which is
imperative for the formation of regional cooperation is
totally lacking among the SAARC members.6 What is very
visible is the political discord and turmoil, with the
antagonistic Indo-Pakistani relations being the centerpiece.
The political tension in South Asia is augmented by the

5Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South
Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989)> vii.
6Rajiv Kumar, "International Economy and Its Impact on
the Asian-Pacific Region," in V.D.Chopra, M.Rasgotra and
K.P. Mishra, eds., Asia-Pacific: Economic Potentials and
Prospects (New Delhi: Continental Publishing House, 1988),
74.
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acute fear of Indian hegemony which continues to influence
the actions of the other SAARC members.
In essence, regional cooperation in South Asia has to
be politically motivated.

If SAARC is to succeed, the

"contentious bilateral issues" which have been excluded from
the scope of the Charter must be addressed.

It seems quite

impossible to expect the SAARC members to cooperate with one
another while these disputes continue to exist.

These

disputed issues, supplemented by the lack of understanding
among the regional elites, continue to mar the development
of cooperation within South Asia.
This thesis consists of four chapters.

The first

chapter lays out the theoretical framework for regional
cooperation in South Asia, including the main argument of
this thesis, that successful regional cooperation depends on
political cooperation.

Political cooperation, in turn, has

been elusive in South Asia, mainly due to the absence of
elite rapport stemming from the congruence of political
beliefs and common threat perceptions.
The second chapter provides a brief history of the
evolution of regional cooperation in the South Asian region,
highlighting both the intra-regional and extra-regional
factors which impeded the development of a regional body for
a considerable period of time.

The chapter illustrates that

divergent political beliefs and the absence of common threat
perceptions retarded the development of regional cooperation

7
in South Asia.
The third chapter, analyzing the inherent
characteristics of the South Asian region, focusses on the
different political and economic obstacles which have
obstructed the progress of SAARC, and demonstrates the
direct relationship between the preponderance of bilateral
political conflicts and elite cooperation.
The fourth chapter reviews the proceedings of the five
SAARC Summits.

Focussing on the correlation between elite

rapport and the level of success or failure of the Summits,
this chapter, reveals the political character of these
meetings.

Power politics and strategic manouvering between

India and Pakistan have been the principle feature of the
Summits held so far.
The conclusion will once again reiterate the
fundamental theme of this thesis, which is supported by the
brief history of the SAARC: Elite rapport, a product of
shared political values and common perception of threats, is
a pre-condition of the political harmony necessary for
successful regional cooperation.

CHAPTER 1
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theories of regional integration have become an
integral part of the study of modern international
relations.1 Regional cooperation is one of the primary
steps leading to regional integration.

This thesis puts

forward the proposition that political cooperation, stemming
from rapport among regional elites, is a pre-condition for
the success of regional cooperation.

Two elements promoting

elite rapport are congruence in political beliefs and common
threat perceptions.

Contradicting the functional theory of

integration, which emphasizes the importance of socio
economic cooperation, this thesis will illustrate that at
the formative stage of any organization promoting regional
cooperation, political cooperation must precede economic
cooperation rather than the reverse.

The organization under

consideration in this thesis is the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

This chapter lays out the

theoretical framework of the thesis.

theories of regional integration like federalism and
functionalism have become essential components of any study
of modern international relations.
8
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THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION
At the outset, it is imperative that we define the term
”region” and discuss whether South Asia can be considered a
region,

A region may be defined as "a particular geographic

area of the world, the constituent states of which have
shared historical, cultural and economic features and which
in foreign affairs behave as interrelated units.”2

Cantori

and Spiegel, in their study of the subsystems of the world,
identified the South Asian region as a valid subsystem of
states.

They defined the South Asian region comprising

India, which forms what Cantori and Spiegel call the core
sector, and Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka,
Maldives, Afghanistan and Burma, which they call the
peripheral sector.3
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) consists of all these states except Sikkim,
Afghanistan and Burma.

The only additional member is

Bangladesh which emerged from the former province of East
Pakistan in 1971.

Sikkim was incorporated as a state into

the Indian Union in 1975.

The founders of the SAARC

overlooked Burma, as it has always maintained an

2Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South
Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989); 7.
3Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, ”The
International Relations of Regions,” in Richard A. Falk
and Saul H. Mendlowitz, eds., Regional Politics and World
Order (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973),
339.
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isolationist stance in international politics.

The Soviet

intervention and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan in
1979, sealed its fate regarding membership of the SAARC in
the formative years of the organization.

However, since

then the Kabul Government has shown enthusiasm over joining
the SAARC and made an attempt to join the SAARC in 1987.
But the SAARC members except India, rejected the Afghan bid.
To summarize, geographically, historically and
culturally, South Asia does indeed constitute a region, even
though political disparities are great.
All the South Asian states share the same political
background, i.e. the colonial past, but the post colonial
state that emerged took very diverse forms.
Lanka functioned as democracies.

India and Sri

Pakistan and Bangladesh

went through phases of democratic and authoritarian regimes
with the military playing prominent roles in both states.
Nepal which for a long time remained under the authority of
the monarch, witnessed the emergence of a more democratic
' system in 1990.

Bhutan remains a traditional monarchy while

Maldives has a presidential system of Government.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
The concept of integration can be defined as "forming
parts into a whole or creating interdependence.,,A Ernst

ARobert J. Lieber, Theory and World Politics
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop, 1972), 38.
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Haas, a principle exponent of regional integration theory
states that:
the study of regional integration is concerned with
explaining how and why states cease to be wholly
sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge,
and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual
attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new
techniques for resolving conflict between themselves.
Regional cooperation, organizations, systems and
subsystems may help describe steps on the way. but they
should not be confused with the resulting condition.5
There is a lack of consensus among scholars about the
scope of integration.

Amitai Etzioni regards integration as

a •'terminal" condition.6

Karl Deutsch, on the other hand,

identifies integration as a "process leading to the creation
of security communities."7
For this study of the South Asian model for regional
cooperation, Morton Kaplan's definition of the integration
process seems most suitable.

Kaplan defines integration as

"a process by which separate systems develop a common
framework which allows for the common pursuit of some goals

5Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration:
Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-Theorizing,"
International Organization Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970):
610.
6Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative
Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1965), 6.
7Karl Deutsch, et al., eds., Political Community and
the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957), 70.
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and common implementation of some policies.”8
In South Asia, the SAARC provides the framework for the
implementation of policies intended for the development of
some goals.

The SAARC Charter states that the goal of the

SAARC is the socio-economic development of the region and
the promotion of peace and harmony based on mutual trust.9
Haas' definition of regional integration does not seem to
fit the South Asian model primarily because the SAARC
Charter clearly states that there will be no infringement
whatsoever on the sovereignty of the member states.

Hence,

Kaplan's definition is more appropriate to explain the South
Asian case.
There is considerable confusion regarding the usage of
regional integration and regional cooperation and an effort
should be made to avoid the use of these terms
interchangeably.

Haas defines regional cooperation as, "a

vague term covering any interstate activity with less than
universal participation designed to meet some commonly
experienced need.”10 The study of regional cooperation
provides the data on the activities or beliefs of the
principle groups involved, while the study of regional
integration is more concerned with the "outcomes or

®Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), 98.
9See Appendix A.
10Haas, 611.
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consequences of these activities for the region in
question".11 Regional cooperation can be studied either as
a part of regional integration or as a separate subject of
its own.

Regional cooperation maybe regarded as the means

to the end, the end being regional integration.

This thesis

will use the term regional cooperation when discussing the
SAARC, appropriate to its present state of development.

THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
There are numerous theories and interpretations of
regional integration.

This portion of the chapter will

concentrate on reviewing four traditional theories of
regional integration.

These are: federalism, functionalism,

neo-functionalism and communications theory.
Federalism constitutes the political and legal approach
to integration.

K.C. Wheare defines federation as an

association of states which has been formed for certain
common purposes, but in which the member states retain a
large measure of their original independence.12

Federal

theorists like Carl J. Friedrich, K.C.Wheare argued that the
establishment of common institutions facilitate the "growth
of common attitudes and a sense of community."13

11Ibid.
12K .C • Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford
University Press, 1953), 1.
13Lieber, 39.

Federalists propagate the uniting of a set of political
communities in a common order with limited infringement on
their autonomous status.14 They are concerned with the
constitutional approach advocating the formulation of
written constitutions specifying the division of powers
among the various constituent units.
Functionalism emphasizes the preeminence of socio
economic factors over the political factors in forging
regional cooperation.

Functionalism "attempts to identify

common international economic and social problems and create
regional or global organizations to deal with them."15
This would lead to a "conglomeration of border-crossing
organizations" which would ultimately control every facet of
the socio-economic life.16 The underlying belief is that
the establishment of socio-economic ties, it would lead to
the solution of other problems as well.
the "spill-over" effect.

The emphasis is on

Functionalism would "overlay

political divisions with a spreading web of international
activities and agencies, in which and through which the
interests and life of all the nations would gradually be

14Ibid.
15Charles A.Duffy and Werner J. Feld, "Wither Regional
Integration Theory?" in Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, ed.
Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe. North
America. The Middle East and Developing Countries(New York:
Pergamon Press, 1980), 500.
16Ibid.
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integrated.1117 The essence of functionalism is that stepby-step economic decisions are superior to crucial political
choices.18
Neo-functionalism developed primarily out of the
criticism of functionalist theory.

Neo-functionalist theory

evolved in the 1950s with the implementation of the Schuman
Plan which led to the formation of the European Coal and
Steel Community.19

Ernst Haas* writings form the core of

neo-functionalist literature.

Haas put forward the

proposition that as "pressure groups begin to organize
across national boundaries in order to be able to influence
policy decisions that were once the monopoly of national
Governments, but that now come under the purview of
supranational institutions, group pressures spill over into
the federal sphere and thereby add to their integrative
impulse.1,20
The neo-functionalists, unlike the functionalists,
recognize the role of the political actor in the integration
process.

Haas defines neo-functionalism as the process

whereby political actors "shift their loyalties,
17David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1946) 14.
18Lieber, 42.
19A.P.Rana, "Regionalism As An Approach to
International Order: A Conceptual Overview," International
Studies Vol. 18, No. 4 (October-December 1979): 523.
2°Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1958), xxxiii.
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expectations or political activities towards a new and
larger center, whose institutions possess or demand
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”21
Karl Deutsch*s communications approach defines
integration using the security community approach.

He

believes that integration among countries may be attained
through the establishment of relationships which build
strong community spirit and this sense of community will
prevent future warfare among the states.22
the communities formed into two categories.

Deutsch divided
The amalgamated

community, where all the independent units formed a single
union, and the pluralist society where the states retain
their separate Governments and their legal sovereignty.23
Deutsch enumerated fourteen conditions which help in the
formation of these communities.

However, he stressed two

indispensable conditions necessary for the formation of both
amalgamated and pluralist communities: compatibility of
major values and mutual responsiveness.2A
According to Deutsch, compatibility of major values
means, "that no value will be considered important in the
relations between political units unless it is important
within each of them, and is considered important in their
21Ibid., 16.
22Deutsch, 5.
23Ibid., 6.
2AIbid., 123-129.
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common relations."25 Mutual responsiveness was "a matter
of perpetual attention, communication, perception of needs
and responsiveness."26
The functionalist school emphasizes economic factors
while Deutsch's two essential conditions for the creation of
security committees are political in character.

MODERN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The 1970s saw a revision in the study of regional
integration.

Ernst Haas admitted that traditional

integration theories were reaching a state of
obsolescence.27

He urged the revision of these theories in

order to explain the modern phenomena of regionalism which
were not following any of the paths predicted by the
classical theories.

Haas advised that the study of regional

integration should be subordinated to the study of the
changing patterns of interdependence.28
Modern theorists, after observing the functioning of
diverse regional bodies, have come to the conclusion that
certain conditions are necessary for the success of regional
cooperation.

Partha Ghosh argues, rather like Deutsch, that

25Ibid., 123.
26Ibid. , 129.
27Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of
Regional Integration," International Organization Vol. 30,
No. 4 (Spring 1976): 208.
28Ibid.
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the essential element for regional cooperation is rapport
among the regional elites.

Shared security concerns and

similar political perspectives form the basis for this
rapport.29
Mohammed Ayoob, after studying the EC, the ASEAN and
the GCC, comes to the conclusion that the indispensable
factors for the success of regional cooperation are
political and strategic rather than economic in nature.30
He states that in the initial stages of any regional
organization promoting cooperation, political cooperation
has to precede economic cooperation.

Ayoob lists the

factors as:
1) common and similar threats which forms a congruence
in security perceptions.
2) congruence in political perceptions.
3) congruence in strategic perceptions.
4) a consensus regarding the role of the pivotal power
within the regional grouping, a consensus shared by the
pivotal power itself.31
Ayoob*s four conditions indicate the importance of
elite rapport by emphasizing the importance of congruence in
security, political and strategic power perceptions.
This emphasis on elite cooperation by both Ghosh and

29Ghosh, vii.
30Mohammed Ayoob, "The Primacy of the Political: South
Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in Comparative
Perspective,” Asian Survey Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 445.
31Ibid.
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Ayoob may be traced back to Deutsch's security community
approach which accentuated the compatibility of values and
mutual responsiveness among the regional elites as crucial
conditions necessary for the success of regional
integration.
This emphasis on the primacy of political factors can
be found in the works of many political theorists.
Contradicting the traditional functionalist approach, which
emphasized the importance of economic cooperation, these
authors stress the necessity of political cooperation in
bringing about cooperation within a region.
Jacob Viner, in his classic study on the Customs Union,
argues that cooperative economic arrangements are the
outcome of "political and security" considerations rather
than mere economic considerations.32 The preeminence of
political relations shaping the economic framework has been
argued by Robert Gilpin in his work on the effects of the
multinationals as independent actors in international
relations.

Gilpin states that, "politics determines the

framework of economic activity and channels it in the
directions which tend to serve the political objectives of
dominant political groups and organizations".33
32Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1950), 92.
33Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Economic
Relations," in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, ed.,
Globalism versus Realism: International Relations1 Third
Debate (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1982), 176-177.
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Constantine Vaitsos, in his analytical study of Latin
American economic integration contends that regional
cooperation Mcalls for a significant role to be played by
the member countries' governments and the viability of the
process is subject to a continuous commitment and
manifestation of political support."34
These scholars clearly believe that regional economic
cooperation has to be preceded by some kind of political
collaboration among the regional elites.

Improved elite

relations are imperative for economic cooperation.

Economic

ties established through political cooperation, in turn,
reinforce the political cooperation already established.
Peter G. Peterson comments that,

"improvement in political

relationships is a pre-requisite for improved economic
relationships, but once in place, economic ties create a
community of interests which in turn improve the environment
for further progress on the political side."35

CONCLUSION
South Asia constitutes a viable region of the world,
for the purposes of this analysis.

Classical integration

theorists have endeavored to explain the growth of regional
34Constantine Vaitsos, "Crisis in Regional Economic
Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A
Survey," World Development Vol. 6 (June 1978): 719.
35Peter G. Peterson, US-Soviet Commercial Relations in
a New Era (Washington D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1972),
3.
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organizations.

However, they have not been able to account

for the success or failure of these

cooperative bodies.

At

present more interest has been shown in the study of
regional cooperation rather than that of regional
integration.
Karl Deutsch, Partha Ghosh and Mohammed Ayoob have
emphasized that for the success of regional cooperation,
certain pre-conditions are necessary.

Propounding the pre

eminence of political cooperation, they state that elite
cooperation is the primary pre-condition for the successful
operation of any scheme of regional cooperation.

This elite

cooperation stems from the presence of congruent political
perspectives and from common threat perceptions.

Hence, for

regional cooperation to succeed, political and strategic
cooperation has to usher in economic cooperation and not the
reverse.
The proposition put forward in this thesis is that
political (including strategic) cooperation must precede
economic cooperation for the successful implementation of
any scheme of regional cooperation.

Political cooperation

depends on cooperation and understanding among the regional
elites.

Using the SAARC as a case study, the following

chapters of this thesis will argue that the rise and fall of
regional cooperation in South Asia can be explained by the
presence or absence of elite rapport and political
cooperation.

CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) was inaugurated in 1985.

It has endeavored to

promote regional cooperation in the conflict-ridden South
Asian sub-continent.

The roots of this movement for

regional cooperation can be traced back a long way.

Several

abortive attempts by Nehru and other statesmen preceded the
final successful scheme proposed by President Ziaur Rahman
of Bangladesh in 1980.

Tracing the evolution of regional

cooperation in South Asia, this chapter illustrates that the
lack of rapport among the regional elite, stemming from the
absence of corresponding political perspectives and common
strategic perceptions, delayed regional cooperation in South
Asia.

EARLY ATTEMPTS
The history of regional cooperation in South Asia can
be traced to ancient times.

Neither man nor a state can

survive in absolute isolation.

22

The necessity for self

23
preservation promotes interrelations.1 States often
"cooperated” with one another in order to attain some common
goal.

These early ventures were strategic in nature, with

rulers of different kingdoms and principalities forming
alliances to either ward off foreign invasions or to fight
amongst themselves to preserve territorial integrity.
The ancient epic, the Mahabharata, provides a vivid
account of the battle (estimated to have taken place around
1000-700B.C.) between two Aryan tribes.

The Kauravas and

the Pandavas formed extensive alliances with other tribes to
establish their control over the northern parts of the sub
continent.2

In 327 B.C., King Porous tried unsuccessfully

to unite the local princes in order to prevent Alexander's
invasion of the north-western parts of the Indian
subcontinent.3
Later on, time and again, the Rajput princes and other
Hindu rulers endeavored to put aside differences and
cooperate with one another to stem the Muslim invasion of
India.

In 1191 A.D., Rajput princes rallied under the

leadership of Prithvi Raj Chauhan to defeat the Muslim

XT.B. Mukherjee, Inter-State Relations in Ancient India
(Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967), 46.
2Romila Thapar, A History of India: Volume T
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966) , 3.1.
3J. Allan, Sir T.Wooseley Haig and H.H. Dodson, The
Cambridge Shorter History of India (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1934), 24.

24
conqueror, Muhammed Ghori.4 From the sixteenth century
onwards, with the conquest of South Asia by the European
powers, most of these cooperative alliances aimed at ending
foreign rule and re-establishing indigenous regimes.
In the twentieth century, the earliest call for Asian
regionalism came from the Japanese who raised the slogan,
"Asia for the Asians."5 However, the Japanese invasion of
Southeast Asia proved that this call was motivated more by
imperial ambition rather than any idealistic plans of
regional cooperation.
On the sub-continent, leaders of the Indian
Independence movement supported this concept of pan-Asian
regionalism enthusiastically, especially to end colonial
rule in the continent.

Many Indian leaders reiterated this

idea of forming an Asian Federation.6

In August 1945,

Jawaharlal Nehru stated, "I stand for a South Asian
Federation of India, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Burma."7
Nehru and other leaders of the Indian National Congress
believed that cooperation with the neighboring countries
would be a critical element in the preservation of India's

4Thapar, 236.
5S .D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in
South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), 10.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., citing, J.S. Bright, ed., Before and After
Independence: Collection of Nehru's Speeches 1922-1950
(New Delhi, 1950).
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security interests and for the socio-economic development of
the country.8
British rule on the Indian sub-continent ended in 1947.
The British left behind not one but two states within the
sub-continent using the religion-based "two nation theory”
to divide pre-independent India.

The Islamic state of

Pakistan was created from parts of British India.

Partition

and the emergence of Pakistan created two hostile forces on
the sub-continent.

Both India and Pakistan sought the help

of extra-regional powers to help maintain the equilibrium
within the region.

Pakistan, fearing re-absorption within

Hindu India's rule, actively sought alliances with the
Islamic states in West Asia and other Western powers.

India

turned, at various times, to both the Soviet Union and the
United States when her security interests were threatened.
The post-Second World War period saw the formation of a
number of cooperative bodies in Europe, as strategic
alliances paved the way for economic cooperation among the
European states.

The war-devastated European countries

realized that mutual cooperation would not only be of
strategic importance but would also help in the economic
recovery of the region.

Inspired by the European efforts at

regional cooperation, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime

8S .D. Muni, "India's Political Preference in South
Asia: A Study in India's Responses to Systematic Changes in
the Region," India Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 1 (January-March
1976): 23.
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Minister of independent India, attempted to popularize the
concept of regional cooperation in the South Asian region
which at that period included not only the sub-continent but
also Southeast Asia.

Nehru*s vision of Asia included both

the political and economic integration of the region.9
From 1950 onwards, several conferences were held by
both South and Southeast Asian states for the promotion of
economic and technological cooperation.

These included the

Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, the Colombo
Powers Conference in 1954 and the Bandung Conference of
Afro-Asian states in 1955.

These conferences proved to be

mere fora for discussions and deliberations? no concrete
plans of action for cooperation evolved from them.
Nehru, a fervent supporter of regional cooperation,
actively preached the benefits of cooperation among the
South Asian states.

In collaboration with Bandarnaike of

Sri Lanka, he formed the Asian Relations Organization to
promote cooperation within the region in 1947.10

Despite

the lack of support from the other states of the area, Nehru
continued to promote his ideas for the formation of a
regional cooperative body, but lack of support finally
forced him to dissolve the unofficial Asian Relations

9R .V .R . Chanderasekhara Rao, "Regional Cooperation in
South Asia," Round Table 293 (January 1985): 54.
10Muni and Muni, 12, citing Sisir Gupta, India and
Regional Integration in South Asia (Bombay: Asia Publishing
House, 1964), 37.

27
Organization in 1957.11
A principle reason for the failure of Nehru's endeavors
was the change in the political environment of the region
with the advent of Cold War politics.

Nehru himself charged

the United States with introducing Cold War politics in
South Asia.12 Most of the newly independent states
actively participated in the emerging alliance systems
chiefly to obtain aid for the development of their
economies.

Cold War politics divided the Asian states into

opposing camps, totally embroiled in bloc politics.
In Asia itself, Pakistan, China and other smaller
powers opposed Nehru's attempts at forging regional
alliances, in an attempt to thwart what they considered to
be increasing Indian dominance of the region.

In fact, the

budding rivalry between India and China led to the
cancellation of the Second Asian Relations Conference in
Nanking in 1949.13
By the mid 1950s, the first wave of enthusiasm for
regional cooperation had come to an end.

By this time

however, Southeast Asia had developed a distinct regional
identity of its own shaped mainly by security
11Ibid.
12Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "American Policy in South Asia:
Interests and Objectives, " in Stephen Cohen, ed., The
Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987),
122.

13Muni and Muni, 15.
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considerations.14

The South Asian region, now consisting

of the Indian subcontinent and other neighboring countries
(Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma) remained merely a
geographic expression.

THE COLD WAR ERA
South Asian regionalism suffered a setback in 1955 when
Pakistan joined the US sponsored Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and the South-East Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO).

Pakistan with her perpetual fear of Indian

expansion, joined the alliances to secure foreign help in
the event of an Indian attack.15
India, on the other hand, joined the newly-emerging
non-aligned movement and non-alignment soon formed the core
of Indian foreign policy.

The non-alignment advocated by

Nehru had its roots in the concept that power politics
causes war and that the pursuit of peace meant keeping free
of alliances with Superpowers.16 Nehru realized that
remaining non-aligned would be the best course of action for
India, allowing her to obtain aid from both the blocs.17
14Rao, 57.
15Cheema, 121.
16Sauripada Bhattacharya, The Pursuit of National
Interests Through Neutralism: India*s Foreign Policy in the
Nehru Era (Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Ltd., 1978), 5-15.
17Ahmed A Kadeer, “The Concept of Non-Alignment and Its
Impact on South Asia," Pakistan Horizon Vol. 34, No. 3
(1981): 42.

29
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 further reinforced this
widening rift in the foreign policy orientations of the two
major South Asian powers.
The late 1960s however, saw the emergence of another
wave of regionalism within South Asia.18

Increased U.S.

involvement in the region prompted the Soviet Union to make
some efforts to promote cooperation and extend its influence
within the region.19 The growing awareness in the benefits
of economic cooperation was fostered by the activities of
the UNCTAD and other regional commissions established by the
U .N .20
In the mid 1970s, the South Asian states underwent
massive internal political upheavals.

1977 proved to be the

year of political "upsets” in the region.

In India, the

newly formed Janata Party defeated the Congress Government
led by Mrs.Indira Gandhi.

In a major coup, General Zia-ul-

Haq toppled the Government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto in Pakistan.

In Sri Lanka, President Jayawardene

took over from Mrs. Bandarnaike.

In Bangladesh, President

Ziaur Rahman firmly established his power by 1978, filling
in the vacuum created by the assassination of Sheikh Mujibar
Rahman in 1975.
Economic conditions in South Asia contributed to the
18Muni and Muni, 17.
19Ibid., 18.
20Ibid., 19.
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political turmoil.

Low economic growth and high population

growth adversely affected the regional economy.21

The

failure of the North-South negotiations, forced these states
to consider once again and perhaps more seriously, the
possibility of cooperating within the region to alleviate
the wretched living conditions of their respective
populations.22

THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL
The final attempt at the promotion of regional
cooperation was made by President Ziaur Rahman of
Bangladesh.

In 1979, President Rahman visited the other

South Asian states and proposed his scheme for regional
cooperation in South Asia.

Encouraged by the responses of

the other South Asian states, the Bangladeshi President
formulated the Bangladesh Proposal of 1980, regarded as the
genesis of the present South Asian Regional Cooperation
(SARC).
The question that rises is what motivated President
Ziaur Rahman to pursue this scheme for regional cooperation.
There is no doubt that the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in 1979 did play a significant role in
accelerating the development of regional cooperation within

21Pramod Kumar Mishra, South Asia in International
Politics (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1984), 79.
22Muni and Muni, 23.
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South Asia.

In Bangladesh, leftist sections of the media

alleged that President Ziaur Rahman had been influenced by
the

U.S. under the Carter Administration.

In fact, they

accuse the Bangladesh Proposal of being a mere "echo” of the
Carter Doctrine of January 1980.23
On 2 3 January 1980, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter in
his State of the Union address, outlined the Carter Doctrine
which in view of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan,
emphasized the necessity of a cooperative security framework
in South and South-West Asia.24 U.S. officials were sent
to "persuade" the South Asian states to "evolve a regional
approach" within the region.25 The Gulf Cooperation
Council institutionalized regional cooperation in South-West
Asia.

In South Asia, President Zia issued the 1980 proposal

which contained broad outlines for a scheme for regional
cooperation.
President Zia's Proposal caused mixed reactions in the
region.

While Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives

appeared enthusiastic about the proposal of regional
cooperation, the two major players of the South Asian arena,
India and Pakistan, remained apprehensive.

In 1980, Mrs.

23S.D. Muni, "Political Imperatives," in Bimal Prasad
ed., Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and
Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1989), 40,
citing Holiday Weekly (Dhaka) 15 June 1980.
24S .D. Muni, "SARC: Building Regionalism From Below,"
Asian Survey Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 394.
25Ibid.
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Gandhi returned to power in India.

Her Government exhibited

skepticism over accepting a scheme which they felt was
covertly being sponsored by the United States.26

The

Indian Government also feared that this would probably allow
Pakistan and the other South Asian nations to "gang up"
against India.27

On the other side, the Government of

Pakistan remained apprehensive about the possible Indian
domination of the organization and the benefits of economic
cooperation which could very well lead to the Indian
domination of the regional market.28
At the onset, despite their lukewarm reactions, neither
the Indian nor the Pakistani Governments completely rejected
the Bangladesh Proposal.

India felt that rejection of this

proposal would definitely undermine its regional policy.29
However, they sought to modify the proposal in order to
accommodate their respective fears and apprehensions.

PRELIMINARY STEPS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION
As a result of the Bangladesh Proposal, a series of
talks took place between the regional and the extra-regional
powers.

The Foreign Ministers of the concerned states met

26Ibid., 395.
27Salamat Ali, "In ASEAN*s Footsteps," Far Eastern
Economic Review. 5 December 1985, 44.
28Muni, "SARC: Building Regionalism from Below," 396.
29Ibid.
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in New York in September 1980.30

They decided to hold a

meeting of the Foreign Secretaries to discuss the initial
arrangements which would then be followed by a meeting at
the Ministerial level and finally the Summit sessions with
the Heads of Government.

The unanimous decision reached at

New York was to exclude the bilateral and controversial
issues from the agenda of the initial talks.31

Bangladesh

assumed the responsibility of preparing the initial draft
proposal for the first meeting.
Bangladesh sent its working paper on regional
cooperation to the other nations in November 1980.

The

paper reemphasized the importance of cooperation for the
economic development of the region as a whole and reiterated
the hope that "a shared heritage in the region in terms of
commonness in ethnicity, language, religion, history and
culture would serve as a unifying factor by minimizing
bilateral differences.”32 The areas of cooperation
proposed were telecommunications, meteorology, transport,
shipping, tourism, agricultural research, joint ventures,
market promotion, educational and technical cooperation and
cultural cooperation.33
30Muni and Muni, 34.
31Ibid. , 35.
32Pramod Kumar Mishra, "Towards A Framework of South
Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu," Foreign
Affairs Report Vol. 21, No. 12 (December 1982): 214.
33Ibid. , 216-217.
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The first meeting of the Foreign Secretaries was held
in Colombo in April 1981.

At this meeting, the group

undertook the task of identifying the areas of cooperation.
The Indian delegation expressed apprehension about
discussions of bilateral political issues which might lead
to the criticism of domestic policies and exert undue
pressure on India.34

Their Pakistani counterpart voiced

reservations about the rapid institutionalization of
regional cooperation.35 The areas of cooperation agreed in
Colombo included agriculture, rural development,
telecommunications, weather and environmental implications,
and health and population control.

However, the Joint

Communique issued after the meeting clearly stated that
"bilateral and contentious issues" were to be excluded from
the scope of these regional forums.36
Study Groups were set up to investigate the five areas
of cooperation.

Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri

Lanka had the responsibility of coordinating these groups.
The Study Groups had to make definite recommendations at the
next meeting to be held at Kathmandu.

A Committee of the

Whole, consisting of representatives of all the seven states

34Emajuddin Ahamed, SARC-Seeds of Harmony (Dhaka:
University Press Ltd., 1985), 16.
35Mishra, 219.
36Ahamed, 16.
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was set up to consider other areas of cooperation.37
The second meeting of Foreign Secretaries, held at
Kathmandu in November 1981, added four more areas of
cooperation to the agenda.

These included communication and

transportation? sports, arts and culture? postal service?
and scientific and technical cooperation.

The existing

Study Groups were converted into Working Groups and were
entrusted with the task of drawing up comprehensive programs
in the long and short term phases.

The immediate action

program would include activities such as the exchange of
data and information, exchanges involving experts and
training facilities, and the organization of seminars and
workshops on a regional basis.

The long term program of

action included the assessment of needs and resources,
preparation of specific projects of regional nature and the
modalities for financing the projects.38
The third conference of the Foreign Secretaries was
held in Islamabad in August, 1982.

It ended on a very

positive note as the states expressed their faith in the
concept of regional cooperation.

The participants

unanimously decided that the next meeting would be at the
ministerial level.

In the interim period, two meetings held

37Mishra, 220.
38From SARC to SAARC; Milestones in the Evolution of
Regional Cooperation in South Asia (1980-1988); Vol I
(Kathmandu: South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation, 1988), 23.
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in Dhaka (March 1983) and New Delhi (April 1983), formulated
the guidelines to be discussed in the first meeting of the
Foreign Ministers.
In August 1983, the Foreign Ministers of the seven
states met at New Delhi to inaugurate the South Asian
Regional Cooperation (SARC).39 Endorsing the decisions
reached at the previous meetings and formulating the SARC
Declaration, the member nations once again confirmed their
faith in the viability of SARC.

The SARC finally emerged

from the conceptual stage to the pragmatic, realistic stage
with definite principles and defined programs of action.
Further meetings held at the Ministerial level at Male
in July 1984 and in Thimpu in May 1985 settled the framework
of regional cooperation in South Asia.

These preparatory

stages paved the way for the first summit of the Heads of
Government of the seven member states.

THE FIRST SAARC SUMMIT
In December 1985, the heads of Government of
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka, met in Dhaka and adopted the Charter which formally
institutionalized SARC with the formation of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

This was

indeed a momentous occasion in the conflict-torn history of
39The South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) was
institutionalized in 1985 with the formation of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

37
South Asia.

The seven leaders reaffirmed their commitment

to accelerate the socio-economic development of the region
through mutual cooperation.
The formation of the SAARC was heralded all over South
Asia.

The intellectual community, in particular, showed

optimism and faith about the success of the SAARC.
world-wide reaction was mixed.

The

Though lauding the efforts

of the South Asian states, there was widespread general
skepticism about the efficiency and success of such a
movement in a region plagued by extreme tension and illfeeling with long-standing unresolved political problems.

CAUSES FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL
The fundamental cause for the success of the
Bangladesh Proposal (as opposed to those attempted by Nehru)
lies in the fact that the 1980 proposal came from a
secondary power and not either of the two major powers in
South Asia.

Nehrufs initiatives failed mainly because the

other nations, primarily Pakistan, refused to accept any
plans of cooperation conceived by India, which they felt
might very well be intended to disguise Indian hegemonic
ambitions.
The smaller states of the region enthusiastically
supported the movement.

The relative success of the EC, the

ASEAN and other regional bodies provided the much needed
incentive to organize and promote regional cooperation.

India and Pakistan hesitated initially, but ultimately
accepted the proposals.

The relations of the Congress

Government of Mrs. Gandhi and the post-Mujib regimes of
Bangladesh had never been very cordial.

Mrs. Gandhi showed

skepticism over accepting a Bangladeshi scheme of
cooperation.40
cautious.

Hence, the Indian reaction was very

A spokesman for the Foreign Office declared on 22

May 1980, that India accepted the Proposal in principle, but
restricted only to economic cooperation.41 However, from
1981 onwards India changed its stance and showed greater
enthusiasm for regional cooperation.

India concurred in the

end because she calculated that supporting the movement
would build her image within the South Asian region and also
raise her international prestige.42
Pakistan remained doubtful about the efficacy of this
proposal for regional cooperation.

A leading Pakistani

daily observed that the existence of bilateral disputes and
the absence of a common political purpose would restrict
regional cooperation to a consultative forum.43

Pakistan

40Rao, 57.
41M.B.Naqvi, "South Asian Cooperation,” Pakistan Horizon
Vol. 36, No. 3 (1983): 21.
42Dilip Bobb, "South Asia:
Today, 15 October 1983, 63.

Sphere of Suspicion,” India

43Muni, ”SARC: Building Regionalism from Below,” 396,
citing Dawn (Karachi), 29 May 1980.
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agreed after some covert persuasion by the U.S.4*
President Zia's Proposal owes its success to strategic
timing and the politico-economic environment of the region
at the times.

CONCLUSION
While the rest of the world made rapid progress towards
regionalism, South Asia until 1983, remained a geographic
expression torn apart by bilateral conflicts augmented by
distrust among the regional elites.

The evolution of

regional cooperation in South Asia clearly demonstrates that
lack of common political perspectives and strategic
perceptions slowed the development of regional cooperation
within the region.

Diverging political orientations of the

political elites of the two major powers, India and
Pakistan, alienated them from one another.

“Ali, 44.

CHAPTER 3
OBSTACLES TO REGIONAL COOPERATION: BILATERAL FRICTION

The birth of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), heralded all over the world, gave rise
to hopes that this organization would ultimately reduce
regional friction in South Asia.

However, the progress of

the SAARC has been hampered by the "contentious" bilateral
relations among the states in this region.

This chapter

analyzes the basic characteristics shaping the political and
economic environment of the South Asian region which have
led to discord among the regional elites.

The chapter also

demonstrates that divergent political orientations have led
to a multitude of political and economic problems in the
region, and that these problems arise primarily in the
bilateral relations between India and the other South Asian
states.

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION
The two basic characteristics of the region are

40

41
Indocentrism and "asymmetrical power structures."1 The
whole South Asian region is Indocentric in nature:
geographically, culturally and to a certain extent
economically.2 The Partition of British India in 1947
created the two principle states of the South Asian regionIndia and Pakistan.
Pakistan

East Pakistan broke away from West

in 1971 and formed the state of Bangladesh.

All

the other states in the region have common land and maritime
borders with India (but not with each other) and their old
ties with British India formed the foundation of their
relations with the present Indian state.
The second characteristic of the South Asian region is
the asymmetrical power balance.

India's superiority within

the region can be discerned by comparing its "size,
population, resource-base, potential for growth, military
strength and viability of the constitutional and political
system" with any other South Asian state.3

Consequently,

South Asia must be regarded as India-dominated.
These two characteristics have led to political and
economic problems.

Nearly all the bilateral political

disputes within the region have one common element— India.
These problems, some concerning boundary issues while others
^.D.Muni, "India and Regionalism in South Asia: A
Political Perspective," International Studies Vol. 17, No.
3-4 (July-December 1978): 487-488.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.,486.
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involving ethnic crises or the sharing of common resources,
rise primarily from the Indocentric nature of the sub
continent.

Within the region, the dominating presence of

India is the main stumbling block to economic cooperation,
as the other nations fear Indian domination of their markets
and subsequently of their economies.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Political discord is the legacy of the years of
colonial rule in this region.4 The genesis of the "South
Asian sub-system of states,” the 1947 Partition of India,
generated and since then has maintained the hostile
relations between the two largest countries of the region,
India and Pakistan.5 The two bi-products of this Partition
are the disputed boundaries and the presence of ethnic
minorities in the different South Asian states.6
Independence from colonial rule broke up the integrated
regional economy and each state began to pursue independent
economic policies and grew more and more alienated from

4Pramod Kumar Mishra, South Asia in International
Politics (Delhi: UDH Publishers, 1984), 2.
5Bhabani Sen Gupta, Amit Gupta and Prakash Nanda,
"Regionalism in South Asia: Roles and Behavior,” in
Bhabani Sen Gupta ed. Regional Cooperation and Development
In South Asia (Volume I): Perception. Military and Nuclear
Arms (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986), 18.
^uni, 482.
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continuing intra-regional trade.7 The 1947 Partition laid
the foundation of the growing mistrust among the regional
elites.
Political problems in South Asia stem from the question
of national integration compounded by the nation-building
and developmental processes in the different states.8 The
power disparities within the region are accentuated by the
presence of different kinds of political structures.
Muni

states that cooperation

is also dependent on

S.D.
"elite

coalitions" and stresses the role of "constructive and viable
coalitions of the ruling elites on the sub-continent."9

The

present political discord in South Asia may be attributed to
the lack of such elite coalitions.
India is central to the region and India•s contiguous
boundaries with
bilateral

other countries

lead to the dominance of

rather than multilateral

relations.

India

has

common boundaries with Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and
shares maritime boundaries with Sri Lanka and Maldives.

None

of the other member states share common boundaries with one
another.

As a result, bilateralism is the principle mode of

7Mishra, 2.
8Muni, 491.
9Ibid., 499.

44
interaction within the sub-continent.10

INDIA AND PAKISTAN
The centerpiece of South Asian politics is the IndoPakistani relationship.

The fragile balance of regional

cooperation will always rest on this "hypersensitive
fulcrum.”11 Partition of the country based on the two
nation theory which emphasized the differences between the
Hindus and the Muslims, led to the creation of Pakistan in
1947.

Bloody communal riots preceded the 1947 Partition of

the country and led to the dislocation of thousands of
people.

This Partition forms the foundation of the Indo-

Pakistani rivalry.

The mutual suspicion of the Hindus and

the Muslims did not recede after 1947.

The creation of

Pakistan on the sub-continent "transformed the intercommunal fight into an inter-state conflict."12 The
fundamental justification for the existence of Pakistan, the
creation of a Muslim homeland for the Muslims in the old
undivided Indian state, runs directly at odds with the
modern Indian emphasis on a secular state.

In fact, the

10S.D.Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in
South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), 56.
11Srinivas Prasad, "SAARC: Painful Progress," India
Today. 15 December 1986, 65.
12Gowher Rizvi, "The Rivalry between India and
Pakistan," in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, ed., South Asian
Insecurity and the Great Powers (New York: St. Martin*s
Press, 1986), 96.
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hostility between the two states stem from the opposing
concepts of an Islamic state and a secular state.13
Territorial conflicts between the two states have led
to three wars and numerous border skirmishes since 1947.
The bone of contention between the two states is the
possession of Kashmir.

In 1947, the Hindu Maharajah of the

Muslim majority province of Kashmir, after initial
hesitation, joined the Indian Union.

Pakistan, on the other

hand, felt that Kashmir being a Muslim dominated province,
rightfully belonged to Pakistan and this liberation of
Kashmir became the focal point of Pakistani domestic and
international politics.
The first Indo-Pakistani War broke out in 1947 when the
Maharajah of Kashmir joined the Indian Union.

At the time

of Partition, the different princely states were given the
option of either joining India or Pakistan.

The Maharajah

of Kashmir, Hari Singh, remained undecided.

In fact, Hari

Singh harbored plans of forming his own independent
state.14

However on 22 October 1947, several hundred

tribesmen from Pakistan stormed into the western part of
Kashmir heading towards the capital, Srinagar.15

In

desperation, the Maharajah, appealed to India for help.

The

13Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia
(New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989), 18.
14Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War In South Asia
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 17.
15Ibid. , 18.
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Indian Government insisted on accession to the Indian Union
as a pre-condition for extending any help.
joined the Indian Union on 27 October 1947.

The Maharajah
The very next

day, Indian forces landed in Kashmir and began full scale
operations against the Pakistani infiltrators.16
The war continued until U.N. mediation finally brought
about a cease-fire in January 1949.17

By this time, India

controlled nearly two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir with only
one-third remaining under Pakistan.18 This episode marked
the beginning of the most hostile bilateral issue to plague
the region.

Kashmir, the picturesque valley in the

Himalayas, has turned out to be a battleground between the
two adversaries, India and Pakistan.
The second Indo-Pakistani War began in 1965.

This was

preceded by border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch region.
In response to Pakistani infiltrations into Kashmir, Indian
forces crossed over the 1949 cease-fire line and launched
full-scale operations against Pakistan.
be quite a setback for Pakistan.19

This war proved to

Indian forces

penetrated beyond Kashmir and reached the outskirts of
Lahore.

The Tashkent Conference of 1966 followed the U.N.

sponsored cease-fire.

According to the Tashkent

16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Buzan and Rizvi, 99.
19Ganguly, 89.
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negotiations, the Indian forces went back to their
previously held positions, with the 1949 cease-fire line
being reinforced.
The 1965 war led to the acceleration of the rivalry
between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan feared that India was

trying to undermine its sovereignty and territorial
integrity.

This fear proved to be well-founded.

In 1971,

Indian and Pakistani forces clashed once again y this time in
East Pakistan.

The 1971 war led to the break-up of Pakistan

and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh from
the old province of East Pakistan.
The Indo-Pakistani rivalry also launched an arms race
between the two states.

The scale tipped in India's favor

after its 1974 explosion of a nuclear device.

This event

sparked Pakistan's fervent attempts to acquire nuclear
technology to build the "Islamic Bomb."20
In the late 1980s, Kashmir re-emerged as a source of
friction.

Kashmiri separatists have taken up arms against

the Indian government, demanding independence.

They remain

undecided about joining Pakistan or creating their own
state.

At present, Kashmir still remains a trouble-stricken

area with escalated violence between the Indian troops and
the Kashmiri separatists.
Allegations about overt Pakistani support for the
20Ashwini K.Ray, "Pakistan's Post-Colonial Democracy:
Implications for Indo-Pakistani Relations," Economic and
Political Weekly. 22 April 1989, 867.
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Kashmiris and the Sikh separatists in Punjab, has
exacerbated Indo-Pakistani discord.

Amanullah Khan, one of

the leaders of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF), revealed that from 1986 onwards the Pakistani
Government of General Zia-ul-Haq sponsored and operated
terrorist training camps.21

Pakistan, on the other hand,

has accused India of supporting the Sindhi nationalist
movement in Pakistan.22
Possession of the Siachen glacier has led to
intermittent clashes between the two nations.

Both India

and Pakistan claim sovereignty over this glacier.

This

situation deteriorated from 1984 to such an extent that it
has been referred to as a "cryogenic bomb which could ignite
a major war between India and Pakistan.”23

The territorial

dispute in the Siachen is based on divergent interpretation
of the watershed principle as a guideline for demarcating
boundaries in mountainous regions.

Pakistan opposes the

Indian occupation of the Saltoro ridge in the Siachen.24
Clashes in 1987 led to prolonged skirmishes between the
armed forces at Siachen and aroused belligerent sentiments
21A .G . Noorani, "The Kashmir Question," India Today. 30
June 1990, 61.
22William L.Richter, "Mrs. Gandhi"s Neighborhood:
Indian Foreign Policy Toward Neighboring Countries," Journal
of Asian and African Studies Vol. 22, No. 3-4 (1987): 251.
23Raminder Singh, "Breaking the Ice," India Today. 15
July 1989, 79.
24Ibid.

49
in both nations.25
Indo-Pakistani relations have become a crucial issue in
the internal politics of the two countries.

Compromising on

Kashmir means political suicide for the politicians of both
nations.

Benazir Bhutto initially endeavored to harmonize

the relations with India.

Opposition parties accused her of

bending to Indian pressures.

Nawaz Sharif, the present

Prime Minister, accused Benazir of having accepted "Indian
supremacy."26

In a sincere bid to garner political

support, Benazir reversed her earlier position and played
the "Kashmir card" quite effectively.27 A "Kashmir policy"
is a must for all electoral campaigns.

Mir Ghous Bux

Bizengo, a Pakistani politician states that in Pakistan,
"India-baiting still commands both votes and support."28
In India too, Kashmir has become an integral part of
the domestic political arena.29

"Nothing unites the

Indians more than the determination to hold Kashmir."30
25Salamat Ali, "Smoothed-Over Summit," Far East
Economic Review. 19 November 1987, 41.
26Shekhar Gupta, "Benazir's Acid Test," India Today. 15
July 1989, 76.
27Shekhar Gupta and Mushahid Hussain, "Benazir Under
Siege," India Today. 31 August 1990, 15.
28Shekhar Gupta, "Fourth SAARC Summit: Coming of Age,"
India Today. 31 January 1989, 26.
29Madhu Jain, "Turning Bitter," India Today. 15
February 1990, 11.
30James Clad, "India: A World at War with Itself," The
Washington P o s t . 31 March 1991, B 3 .
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Hence, no political party can hope to survive by espousing
independence for Kashmir.

This desire to hold on to Kashmir

stems from the belief that to let Kashmir go would lead to
the Balkanization of the Indian state.31
Political problems have affected economic relations
between the two states as well. Government restrictions are
imposed on the movement of goods and people between the two
nations.

Each state has spent a major portion of its GNP

stockpiling weapons to ward off aggressions from the other.
In 1988-89, the Pakistan defence budget was 27.6 percent of
its GNP ($2,240 million).32 Across the border, the Indian
Government allotted 12.1 percent ($9,980 million) of its GNP
to the defence sector.33
This highly sensitive and often explosive relationship
between India and Pakistan, a legacy of the colonial past
continues to be the key issue hampering the development of
regional cooperation in the South Asian region.

INDIA AND BANGLADESH
After the 1971 war, Bangladesh maintained excellent
relations with India.

Indian support for the liberation of

Bangladesh was appreciated and Indian patronage was sought
31Ganguly, 45.
32Thomas J. Timmons, ed and comp., U.S. and Asia
Statistical Handbook (Washington D.C.: Heritage
Foundation, 1989), 63.
33Ibid. , 35.
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by Bangladesh.

Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, the Bangladeshi

leader, maintained close ties with India.

From 1975

onwards, public discontent with Sheikh Mujib*s corrupt
administration translated into the development of antiIndian sentiments and discomfort with the "yoke” of Indian
patronage.34
The deterioration of Indo-Bangladesh relations may be
attributed to the Ganges water dispute, the South TalpattyNew Moore Island conflict and the illegal immigration of
Bangladeshi nationals to India.
The long-standing dispute between India and Bangladesh
over the sharing of the Ganges water intensified with the
completion of the Farrakka barrage in 1975, in the Indian
state of West Bengal.

This barrage diverted nearly 40,000

cubic meters of water per second through a link canal to
prevent the silting of the River Hoogly and the Calcutta
port.35

Bangladesh objected to this diversion of Ganges

water on the ground that it would jeopardize the navigation
and irrigation systems of Bangladesh and harm the
cultivation of crops.
Bangladesh has proposed the construction of storage
dams at the main tributaries of the Ganges in the IndoNepalese borders and the inclusion of Nepal to the sharing

34Richter, 253.
35Ghosh, 86.
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of Ganges water scheme.36

India contends that this

dispute, being strictly bilateral, should not include a
third party and proposed the construction of a link canal
connecting the Brahmaputra to the Ganges.

Bangladesh

opposed the Indian proposal, on the grounds that this would
cause flooding of prime agricultural land, the dislocation
of hundreds of peasant families, and would create a natural
barrier between the northern provinces and the lyther parts
of Bangladesh.37

In Bangladesh, this water dispute has

been politicized and has been used to promote anti-Indian
sentiments.

Government statements and news editorials often

resound with "anti-India tirades."38
South Talpatty island or as the Indians call it the New
Moore Island, is an uninhabited island in the Bay of Bengal.
Both India and Bangladesh claim ownership of the island,
which was formed after a cyclone in 1970.39 This disputed
claim is inter-linked to the conflict over the "delimitation
of sea zones" and is compounded by the conflicting
interpretations of the Law of the Sea formulated in 1982.A0
36M.Rafiqul Islam, "The Ganges Water Dispute: An
Appraisal of a Third Party Settlement," Asian Survey
27, No. 8 (August 1987): 925.

Vol.

37Ibid. ,924.
38Raminder Singh, "The Siege Of Dhaka." India Today. 15
December 1987, 69.
39Habibur Rahman, "Whose is South Talpatty Island?" Asian
Profile Vol. 15, No. 5 (October 1987): 439.
A0Ibid.
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This controversial question of defining maritime boundaries
is also a contentious issue in Indo-Bangladesh
relations.41
The influx of refugees into Calcutta gave India the
pretext for entering the 1971 war.

However over the years

the continuous flow of illegal Bangladeshi nationals into
India, especially into the state of Assam, has led to
serious disputes between the two states.

The Bangladeshi

Government has turned a blind eye to this problem.

This

continuous flow of Bangladeshi nationals into Assam led to
unrest among the Assamese.

The fear of being reduced to

minority status in their own state inspired the Assamese to
agitate for the recognition of their language and claim
preferential treatment for employment.42

In order to check

this flow of Bangladeshi refugees into India, the Indian
Government started to fence the Indo-Bangladeshi border near
Assam.43

Controversy at the Governmental level of the two

nations over the "barbed wire" fence even led to exchange of
fire among the troops guarding the respective borders.44
Despite the looming presence of these bilateral
problems, Bangladesh and India have on numerous occasions
41Ibid., 440
42Sanjib Baruah, "Immigration, Ethnic Conflict and
Political Turmoil: Assam 1979-1985," Asian Survey Vol. 26,
No. 11 (November 1986): 1190.
43Ghosh, 84.
44Ibid. , 85.
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cooperated on various issues like telecommunications, trade
and even border rectifications.45 The long-standing
problem over the lease of Tin Bagha region in West Bengal
was resolved with the "perpetual lease" of the Tin Bagha
area of India to Bangladesh.46 The disputes between India
and Bangladesh, though essentially economic in nature, have
become embroiled in domestic and regional politics of the
region and at present pose serious obstacles to the
prospects of regional cooperation.

INDIA AND SRI LANKA
The activities of the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka
led to adversial relations between India and Sri Lanka. The
issue included the fate of the thousands of Tamil refugees
coming into India.

Some of them were the "Stateless" Indian

Tamils who had been taken to Sri Lanka by the British to
work as plantation workers.

Large numbers of Indian Tamils

were denied Sri Lankan citizenship after the independence of
Sri Lanka.

But most of the refugees coming to India are the

Jaffna Tamils fleeing the violence of terrorist activities
in the northern Tamil-dominated provinces of Sri Lanka.
In the 1980s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealem
(LTTE) escalated their violent activities against the Sri
45Richter, 254.
46P.K.S.Namboodiri, "India and Bangladesh: A New
Beginning," Strategic Analysis Vol. 6, No. 8 (November 1982):
461.
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Lankan Government.

The violence unleashed against the LTTE

in retaliation by the Sri Lankan armed forces raised the
sympathy of the Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
The Government of Tamil Nadu under the rule of Chief
Minister M.G. Ramchandran, extended open support and aid to
the LTTE and provided a base of operation for the Tamil
militants against the Sri Lankan forces.47

Influenced by

the Tamils in India, the Indian Government officially sent
humanitarian aid to the besieged provinces of Jaffna in
1987.48
Despite allegations and counter-accusations, the Sri
Lankan and the Indian Governments signed the Indo-Sri Lankan
Accord on 29 July 1987.

The Accord introduced an Indian

Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to maintain peace and stability
in the Jaffna peninsula.

The temporary truce in Jaffna soon

gave way to a protracted struggle between the IPKF and the
LTTE.

Very soon, the presence of the IPKF was resented by

all sections of the Sri Lankan population, as they felt that
the Tamil problem

was essentially an internal matter. Sri

Lanka, under the Premadasa Government, brought to power by
the elections of 1989, demanded the withdrawal of the IPKF

47S.U.Kodikara, "Regional Roles and Behavior in South
Asia: A Theoretical Framework of Regional Cooperation," in
Bhabani Sen Gupta, ed., Regional Cooperation and Development
in South Asia (Vol 1): Perception, Military and Nuclear Arms
Race Problem (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986), 47.
48P.Venkateshwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,"
Asian Survey Vol. 28, No. 4 (April 1988): 433.
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from Sri Lanka.

The Indian government initially refused,

claiming that the withdrawal would escalate the violence.
Sri Lanka responded by refusing to host the 1989 SAARC
Summit to protest against the presence of the IPKF.
Finally, in January 1990, the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka
but the scars of the political battles still remain.
Bilateral problems between these two states affected the
SAARC and increased regional apprehension about Indian
"hegemony" within the region.

INDIA AND NEPAL
Nepal*s relations with India have gone through both
positive and negative phases.

The Chinese occupation of

Tibet in 1950 led to the strengthening of Nepalese ties with
India.

The Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship

extended Indian influence in Nepalese internal and external
affairs.49

The fundamental basis of Indo-Nepalese

relations is economic in nature.

Being a land-locked state,

Nepal is totally dependent on India for trade and transit.
Nearly 50 percent of Nepal's trade is with India and the
remaining trade overseas is done under the Transit treaty
with India.50
Indo-Nepalese relations gradually deteriorated over the
49Ashraf, 16.
50N .P .Banskota, "Nepal: Towards Regional Economic
Cooperation in South Asia," Asian Survey Vol. 21, No. 3 (March
1981): 344.
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years, especially in the 1980s.
seeking ties with China.

India resented Nepal's

India refused to endorse Nepalese

King Birendra's 1973 proposal for the creation of a zone of
peace.

The Chinese and the Pakistani Governments promptly

endorsed the peace proposal, further arousing Indian
suspicion about this zone of peace.51
In 1987, Nepal for the first time required work permits
for Indians working there.

The Nepalese Government also

imposed an extra 55 percent customs duties on imports from
India.52

India protested against these actions.

The

Indian Government pointed out that Article 7 of the 1950
Treaty granted equal treatment for the citizens of both
states.

The work permits discriminated against the Indian

citizens thereby violating the provisions of the 1950
Treaty.53
In 1989, Indo-Nepalese relations took a hostile turn
with the lapse of the trade and transit agreement between
the two states.54

The Nepalese Government refused to

accept the Indian demand for a single trade and transit
treaty.

India retaliated by closing all but two of the

51Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal's Security Policy and South
Asian Regionalism," Asian Survey Vol. 26, No. 11 (November
1986): 1207.
52Ramindar Singh, "Towards Estrangement," India Today. 30
April 1989, 70.
53Ibid.
54Anirudha Gupta, "India-Nepal Discord," Economic And
Political Weekly. 22 April 1989, 853.
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fifteen transit points on the Indo-Nepalese border leading
to acute shortages of essential commodities in Nepal.55
After considerable deliberation, enmity and adversial
relations between them, the two states finally came to an
agreement over the trade and transit issues.

However, Nepal

still remains wary about increased Indian influence over its
internal and external affairs.

BHUTAN AND MALDIVES
Indo-Bhutanese relations have been very cordial
primarily because Bhutan is dependent on India for its very
survival.

The Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949 stated that

Bhutanese foreign policy would be guided by India.56

India

continues to provide substantial aid to the Bhutanese.
However, over the years, the Bhutanese have grown to resent
this dependence on India and have now established
independent relations with China and several other
countries.
with India.

The relations with China have caused problems
But on the whole, Bhutan has maintained cordial

relations with India and other South Asian states.
The Republic of Maldives consists of 12,000 islands in
19 groups south-west of India in the Indian Ocean. Its
population is predominantly Muslim.57 Maldives has cordial
55Ibid.
56Richter, 255.
57Ashraf, 20.
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relations with all other South Asian nations including
India.

In November 1988, a coup in the capital, Male was

crushed with the help of the Indian army.58

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ELITE RAPPORT
Partha Ghosh has cited elite rapport as a pre-condition
for the success of regional cooperation.

In South Asia,

relationship among the regional elites have had a dramatic
effect on bilateral relations.

Mrs. Gandhi's aggressive

foreign policy (1966-1977) alienated most of the regional
elite except Sheikh Mujibar Rahman of Bangladesh.

During

the short term of Sheikh Mujib's rule (1971-1975), IndoBangladesh relations were extremely cordial.

This

cordiality primarily grew out of the close personal
friendship between Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib.59
The Janata Government's (1977-1980) foreign policy, as
articulateded by Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee,
emphasized the necessity of improving relations with the
neighbors.60

Prime Minister Morarjee Desai met Bangladeshi

President Ziaur Rahman in 1977 and reached a mutually
acceptable agreement over the Farakka water sharing

58Madhu Jain, "An Idyllic Friendship,” India Today. 15
February 1990, 41.
59Mishra, 152.
60Naveed Ahmad, "Recent Developments in Indian Foreign
Policy," Pakistan Horizon Vol. 33, No. 3 (1980): 49.
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issue.61
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, signed by Sri Lankan
President Jayawardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi, is another example of elite cooperation leading to
congenial relations.

However, lack of understanding between

the Rajiv Gandhi and the succeeding Sri Lankan President,
Premadasa, led to new friction over the presence of the
IPKF.
The initial rapport between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir
Bhutto led to the success of the 1988 SAARC Summit at
Islamabad and Indo-Pakistani discord took a turn towards
harmony.

But soon, Ms. Bhutto succumbed to domestic

political pressure and adopted a much harder policy towards
India, especially regarding Kashmir and Siachen.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
A major obstacle to the growth of regional cooperation
in South Asia is the wide disparity in size, population,
economic resources and development between India and the
other member states.

India has 77 percent of the total

population and 72 percent of the total land area of the
region.

She has 84 percent of the arable land, 69 percent

of the irrigated land and nearly 90 percent of all the

61Ibid., 70.
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available resources.62
Another major obstacle is the similarity of trading
patterns.

India and Pakistan compete in three of the four

major categories of Bangladeshi exports, while India
competes in eight of Pakistan's ten categories of
exports.63

Import categories also reveal similarities with

more than 50 percent of the imports of India, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh.64
Economic cooperation remains hampered by the looming
presence of the comparatively large Indian economy in the
South Asian region.

The other SAARC members feel that

unregulated trade within the region, especially with India,
will hurt their newly emerging industries.65 As a result,
most states have imposed trade barriers and other
restrictions.

In these developing nations, governmental

policies regulating trade activities are interrelated to the
political relations.

In Pakistan, severe administrative

62M.L. Qureshi, Survey of Economic Resources and Prospects
of South Asia (Colombo: Lotus Press Ltd., 1981), 7.
63Syedur Rahman, "Issues and Agenda for South Asian
Regional Cooperation: A Bangladeshi Perspective," Asian
Survey Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 414, quoting Principle
Export Commodities. External Market-1981 Statistical
Yearbook (New York, 1982).
64Ibid., quoting "Imports by Broad Economic Categories,"
UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York,
1982) .
65Imtiaz H. Bokhari, "South Asian Regional Cooperation:
Progress, Problem, Potential and Prospects," Asian Survey
Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1985): 386.
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restrictions curb trade with India.66

In South Asia, where

the Governments control every sector of the economy either
directly or indirectly through licensing and other such
devices, the establishment of socio-economic ties seem
impossible in the midst of political tension.
Most of the states are seriously concerned with the
adverse balance of payment situation.

Therefore, most of

the SAARC states are reluctant to reduce trade barriers.67
The loss of extensive customs duties impedes the progress of
trade liberalization in this region.68

Lack of

Infrastructural linkages have affected the development of
economic cooperation within the region.69

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
There is scope for regional cooperation in the economic
sphere.

One should remember that forty-four years ago, the

South Asian region formed part of an integrated colonial
economy.

Scholars have suggested different ways in which

66Rehman Sobhan, "The Economic Background," in Bimal
Prasad ed., Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and
Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1989), 27.
67T.P. Bhatt, "Cooperation For Economic Development," in
M.S. Agwani, et al., ed., South Asia: Stability and Regional
Cooperation (Chandigarh: Center for Research in Rural and
Industrial Development, 1983), 38.
68Ibid.
69Indra Nath Mukherjee, " Economic Constraints and
Potentialities," in Bimal Prasad, ed., Regional Cooperation
in South Asia: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas
Publishing House, 1989), 101.
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economic ties could be re-established.

Principle among them

are the schemes for hydro-electric cooperation between
India, Nepal and Bangladesh.70
Syedur Rahman, has suggested the formation of
cartels for primary commodities like tea and jute.71

These

cartels would then help in price stabilization and reduce
regional friction at the international markets.

Other

cooperative schemes include the sharing of man-power
resources, the potential mineral resources of the Himalayas
and in the sea-bed region surrounding the South Asian
region.72

CONCLUSION
Bilateral friction in South Asia has become embroiled
in the domestic politics of the individual states.

The

Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir forms the centerpiece of
South Asian bilateral friction.
three wars
nations.

This conflict has led to

and endless number of skirmishes between the two
The liberation of Kashmir is the cornerstone of

Pakistani foreign policy and holding on to Kashmir is
70B.G. Verghese, "River Waters: Doubts Hamper
Agreements," in M.D. Dharamdasani, ed., South Asian
Regional Cooperation: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy
(Varanasi: Shalimar Publishing House, 1985), 159.
71Rahman, 416.
72B. Satyanarayana, "Regional Economic Cooperation for
South Asian Countries," in K. Satyamurty, ed., South Asian
Regional Cooperation (Hyderabad: Institute of South Asian
Studies, 1982), 57-58.
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imperative to the Indian political elite.

Any compromise

from either side means political suicide.
The history of bilateral relations show that these
relations can improve or worsen depending on the rapport
among the regional elites.

The 1971 Shimla Agreement

between Mrs. Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan
ameliorated the Kashmir problem and established a line of
control agreed to by both parties.

But, soon this

transitory rapport disappeared and Indo-Pakistani discord
reemerged in full force, after the 1974 explosion of the
Indian nuclear device.
The South Asian region is besieged by the presence of
long-standing political and economic problems which are the
results of the inherent characteristics of the region
itself.

Indocentrism and Indo-domination remain the two

principle and intrinsic features of the South Asian region.
This has led to the proliferation of bilateral problems
among India and her neighbors.

These bilateral problems

amplified by elite discord affected and continue to affect
the progress of the SAARC.

CHAPTER 4
SAARC AT WORK: THE SAARC SUMMITS

The SAARC Charter stated that the members would hold
annual Summits to discuss and review the activities of the
organization.

The first Summit was held in Dhaka in 1985

and was followed by four other Summits held in Bangalore,
Kathmandu, Islamabad and Male.

This chapter summarizes the

proceedings of these annual Summits from Dhaka to Male,
highlighting the correlation between elite rapport and the
relative success and failure of these Summits.

The chapter

focusses on the discord between India and Pakistan and the
effects of this relationship on the progress of regional
cooperation within the region.

THE DHAKA SUMMIT-1985
The Dhaka Summit convened in December 1985 formally
launched the SAARC.

The Charter signed by the member states

laid down the objectives of the SAARC.

These objectives

include the following: to promote the quality of life,
accelerate economic growth and provide the opportunity to
all to live in dignity; to strengthen collective selfreliance and contribute towards building mutual trust; to
65
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promote active collaboration in the economic, technical and
scientific fields including cooperation with other
developing countries and international forums with similar
aims and purposes; and finally to increase people to people
contacts and information between the states of the region.
The principles of the Charter stated that cooperation
shall be based on "respect for principles of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity, political independence,
non-interference in internal affairs of other states and
mutual benefit."1 The Charter further stated that
cooperation should not only be consistent with bilateral and
multilateral agreements but should also complement them.2
Each member state had the veto power and all decisions
required unanimity.3

The SAARC however, excluded all

"bilateral and contentious issues" from the scope of its
Charter.4 The different bodies formed to carry out the
SAARC activities included the Technical Committee and the
Action Committee.

The Standing Committee formed included

the Foreign Secretaries of the member states and had the
responsibility of coordinating and monitoring the whole

1B.D. Dangol ed., SAARC Vovaae From Dhaka to Bangalore
(Kathmandu: Ministry of Education and Culture, Department of
Archeology, 1987), 68.
2Ibid.
3Keesinq's Contemporary Archives. Vol. 32, No. 3 (March
1986), 34243.
4Ibid.
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program of action.

The financial arrangements were on a

voluntary basis with each country deciding on the amount of
its contribution to the SAARC.5
The member states agreed to cooperate in different
areas including transport, telecommunications, postal
services, meteorology, health and family planning,
agriculture and sports.6 Apart from cooperating in
specific areas, the members also recognized the need for the
development of a common view on issues such as the "NorthSouth economic dialogue and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade(GATT) policy."7 The leaders at the Summit
concurred to cooperate in formulating stringent measures to
counter terrorism and drug-trafficking within the region.
They emphasized the necessity of frequent meetings at the
ministerial and bureaucratic levels, and decided to meet at
annual Summits to discuss and review the progress of the
organization.8
The Dhaka Declaration, though praised as a laudatory
effort to establish cooperation in South Asia, has also been
subject to criticism.

Even though all the seven leaders

made long speeches in Dhaka proclaiming the need for

5Dangol, 70.
eFacts on File. Vol. 45, No. 2352
947.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.

(20 December 1985),
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cooperation and mutual trust, they ensured the exclusion of
bilateral and contentious issues from the authority of the
SAARC.

Unanimous decisions and the veto power took care of

the Indian fear of the domination of the organization by
Pakistan and other smaller states and vice versa.
The main rationale behind the SAARC was to establish
some form of economic cooperation among the South Asian
states for the development of the region at large.

However,

trade and industry have been deliberately left out of the
scope of the SAARC Charter, mainly to overcome the fear of
Indian economic domination among other members.

Cooperation

in the trade and industrial sphere is being resisted by the
other South Asian states under the apprehension that India
with its relatively strong and expanding economy would
dominate the regional market, adversely affecting their own
developing economies.

Regional cooperation in trade and

industry would definitely accelerate development within the
region.
The exclusion of bilateral issues from the scope of the
SAARC has been controversial.

It is these issues which form

the main obstacles to regional cooperation in South Asia.
In this region, where politics dictate the economic policy
of the regional states, the future success of regional
cooperation will depend on the nature of the political
relations between the member countries.

The King of Bhutan,

His Highness, Jigme Singhye Wangchuk, in his address to the

Summit explicitly stated, "In the geo-political realities of
our region, it would be unrealistic to ignore the primacy of
the political factor, as in the final analysis, it will be
the political environment of the region that will determine
the shape and scope of regional cooperation in South
Asia."9

However, at the onset, it is the exclusion of

these adverse bilateral political issues from the SAARC
Charter which paved the way for the formation of the SAARC.
All the member states, especially the two principle states
of the region, India and Pakistan, insisted on the exclusion
of these issues as a precondition to their joining the
SAARC.
The Dhaka Summit marked the beginning of the annual
meetings of the member states.

At Dhaka, India and Pakistan

maintained cordial relations with another with very little
dispute during the proceedings.

The Summit set the SAARC in

motion and the members agreed to meet in Bangalore the next
year.

THE BANGALORE SUMMIT-1986
Bilateral conflicts between India and Pakistan on the
one hand and India and Sri Lanka on the other, overshadowed
the proceedings of the second SAARC Summit at Bangalore in
November 1986.

The Summit opened amid reports of Indian

9Bimal Prasad, Regional Cooperation in South Asia:
Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House
Pvt. Ltd., 1989), 12.
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troop movements along the Indo-Pakistani border. In Sri
Lanka, Tamil militants continued their protracted struggle
against the. Sri Lankan armed forces.

The overt sympathy and

support for these Sri Lankan Tamils by their Indian
counterparts seriously affected Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
The Bangalore Declaration adopted by the leaders,
"condemned as criminal all acts, methods and practices of
terrorism.1,10 The Declaration stated that member countries
should "refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another state and that they should not acquiesce in
organized terrorist activity within their own territory.”11
However, the leaders were unable to agree unanimously on the
definition of terrorism.

Hence, they formulated a committee

which was entrusted with the task of coining a suitable
definition of "terrorism” and preparing a draft proposal
acceptable to all members.
The member states endorsed the proposal to establish a
committee to devise cooperation for fighting the drug
trafficking within the region and ratified proposals
establishing a SAARC meteorological center in India and an
agricultural center in Bangladesh.12 The seven leaders
^ Keesing^ Contemporary Archives. Vol. 32, No. 12
(December 1986), 34815.
11Ibid.
12”South Asia:
(January 1987): 4.

The Spirit of SAARC,” Round Table
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agreed to evolve a joint strategy on global economic issues
at international fora.13

The principle achievement of the

Bangalore Summit however, was the establishment of the
permanent SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu with Bangladeshi
diplomat, Abul Ahsan as the first Secretary-General.
Bilateral talks between India and Pakistan and the
Indo-Sri Lankan negotiations received more publicity than
the actual Summit proceedings.

The Pakistani delegation

claimed that nearly two hundred and fifty thousand Indian
troops had moved closer to the Indo-Pakistani border.

The

Indian spokesmen countered the Pakistani accusations by
declaring this troop movement as part of the Indian army*s
annual winter exercises.14

India, on the other hand

expressed concern over the covert Pakistani support for the
Sikh separatists in Punjab.15
The Indo-Sri Lankan taiks on the Tamil issue took place
under very dramatic circumstances.

The Indian Government

set free the Madras-based leaders of the Tamil separatists
who had been placed under house-arrest before the
inauguration of the Bangalore Summit.16 The Indian Prime
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, tried to negotiate a peace
13Dilip Bobb and Srinivas Prasad, "SAARC: Painful
Progress,” India Today. 15 December 1986, 65.
14,,South Asia: Spirit of the SAARC,” 4.
15Ibid.
16Salamat Ali, "Sophistry at Summitry," Far Eastern
Economic Review. 27 November 1986, 30.
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arrangement in Sri Lanka.

The Indian Air Force flew in

three top leaders of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil
Ealem (LTTE) to Bangalore.

The Chief Minister of the Indian

state of Tamil Nadu, M.G. Ramchandran arrived at Bangalore
to participate in the talks .17

Prolonged negotiations took

place behind close doors but the end results did not prove
to be too encouraging.
The Bangalore Summit ended without any significant
attempts at promoting economic cooperation.

India's appeal

for the inclusion of trade and industrial cooperation within
the realm of the Charter met strong opposition from other
members especially Pakistan .18

Even though bilateral

negotiations are outside the scope of the Charter, the
highlights of the Summit included the Indo-Pakistani and
Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral talks.

One might point out that

despite the exclusion of bilateral issues from the actual
SAARC agenda, these Summits provide a convenient opportunity
for the leaders of the region to meet annually to discuss
pertinent bilateral issues.

At the end of the Summit it was

evident that the viability of the SAARC as a regional body
rested on the spirit of trust and mutual cooperation among
the regional elites.

17Ibid.

18Bobb and Prasad, 64.
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THE KATHMANDU SUMMIT-1987
The member states present at the third SAARC Summit
convened in Kathmandu in November 1987 signed the Kathmandu
Declaration which included a convention for the "suppression
of terrorism including a provision for the extradition of
convicted terrorists .1,19 The Declaration also endorsed the
establishment of a food security reserve for combating the
adverse effects of natural disasters and the commissioning
of studies on natural disasters and the protection of the
environment .20
The Convention on Terrorism was the sole achievement of
the third Summit.

This Convention allowed the member states

to obtain the extradition of those individuals engaged in
acts of terrorism in other states or in cases where
extradition was impossible, provisions formulated would
facilitate quick trials .21

However, this Convention

contains certain loopholes, the foremost being that the
decision to accept the extradition requests depended on the
discretion of the states concerned with no mechanism to
force compliance in accordance to the provisions of the
Convention .22
19Keesina's Record of World Events. Vol. 33, No. 12
(December 1987), 35614.
20Ibid.

21Ron Tempest, "7 South Asian Nations Vow Joint Action on
Terrorists," Los Angeles Times. 6 November 1987, 13.
22Ibid.
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As in the previous Summit, the Kathmandu Summit
witnessed tension between the Indian and Pakistani
contingents.

Indo-Pakistani tension aggravated by the armed

skirmishes at the Siachen glacier, a month ago, reflected on
the proceedings of the Summit.

The possession of the

Siachen glacier in the north-eastern part of the IndoPakistani border has led to frequent skirmishes between the
armed forces of the two states stationed in the region.

The

member states, apart from India and Sri Lanka, expressed
concern over the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 and the
presence of the Indian forces in Jaffna.

They were

apprehensive at the prospect of India assuming the role of a
"regional policeman"

and involving itself in the

maintenance of domestic law and order of the South Asian
states .23

In fact for the first time since its inception

in 1985, the SAARC openly discussed a bilateral issue in the
main Summit proceedings.

President Jayawardene1s reference

to the Accord led to heated discussion of bilateral issues.
Pakistan refused to endorse the Indian proposal for an
official SAARC statement on Sri Lanka .24
Another controversial issue was Afghanistan's
application for SAARC membership.

This issue became a bone

of contention between India and Pakistan.

India, the sole

23Ibid.

24Salamat Ali, "Smoothed-Over Summit," Far Eastern
Economic Review. 19 November 1987, 39.
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supporter of the application was opposed by other SAARC
members led by Pakistan.

Zain Noorani, Pakistan's Minister

of State for Foreign Affairs stated that, "while there could
be no objection to the admission of Afghanistan as a nation,
the country being currently under Soviet occupation, could
hardly qualify ."25 India retaliated by vetoing the
Pakistani proposal to grant observer status to the ASEAN .26
Other issues causing controversies included the
Bangladeshi proposal for cooperation in the development of
water resources and Pakistan's proposal for a South Asian
treaty banning nuclear weapons.
proposals.

India vetoed both

On the question of economic cooperation, Mr.

Noorani reiterated Pakistan's stance on the issue by
pointing out that political normalization had to precede
economic cooperation.27
A distinguishing feature of the Kathmandu Summit was
the plethora of bilateral meetings.

Apart from the main

Summit meeting, twenty-one mini summits were held among the
seven leaders .28

Once again bilateral talks received top

billing compared to the Summit.

Kathmandu provided the

ideal meeting ground for talks between the Indian Prime

25Ibid.

26Raminder Singh, "Gang up on Big Brother," India Today.
30 November 1987, 33.
27Salamat Ali, "Smoothed-Over Summit," 40.
28Singh, 33.
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Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and his Pakistani counterpart,
Mohammed Khan Junejo.
The Kathmandu Summit demonstrated that the success of
the SAARC depended on the relations between India and
Pakistan.

The open hostility between these two powers

marred the Summit proceedings.

The other members took sides

depending on their respective interests and the SAARC forum
witnessed a clash of wills and extensive political
manouverings.

Although, the other members are reluctant to

admit it there is no doubt that the SAARC's future as a
viable body depended on the normalization of relations
between India and Pakistan.

THE ISLAMABAD SUMMIT-1988
The Islamabad Summit proved to be the most successful
Summit held to date.

This success is attributed to the

cordial relations between arch rivals— India and Pakistan.
The Summit allowed Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and
the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto
to meet for the first time to discuss not only SAARC issues
but also negotiate on bilateral conflicts.

In fact, the

SAARC Summit had to take a back seat to Indo-Pakistan talks.
International and regional media attention was focussed on
the Gandhi-Bhutto talks.

A Bangladeshi diplomat even

complained that the other members "were made to feel like
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part-players ."29
The Islamabad Declaration, signed on 31 December 1988,
called for joint efforts to combat terrorism in the region
and dedicated 1989 to fighting drug abuse and drug
trafficking .30

The members also accepted the Pakistani

proposal to launch the "SAARC 2000" regional plan which
would include areas such as food, clothing, shelter,
education and primary health .31

The members agreed to open

the membership of the SAARC to all states within the region
and entrusted the Secretariat to come up with a suitable
definition of the boundaries of "South Asia."

A major

achievement was the abolition of visa restrictions
legislators and judges of member states.

for the

This privilege may

later be extended to journalists, bureaucrats and others .32
The members lauded the efforts of the youth volunteer
programs and the establishment of SAARC chairs, fellowships
and scholarship scheme.

This scheme highlights the

importance of cooperation in education within the region .33
The Summit participants called for an end to the
29Shekhar Gupta, "Fourth SAARC Summit: Coming of Age,"
India Today. 31 January 1989, 24.
^ Keesinq's Record of World Events. Vol. 35, No. 2
(February 1989), 36485.
31Salamat Ali, "A Hint of Hope," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 12 January 1989, 11.
32"SAARC Summit: Islamabad Declaration," Strategic Digest
Vol. 19, No. 2 (February 1989): 60.
33Ibid.
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proliferation of nuclear weapons, both at the global and
regional levels.
At Islamabad, the cordiality between India and Pakistan
reflected itself in the SAARC proceedings, which went on
smoothly without any protests or accusations from either
side.

In earlier Summits the animosity between India and

Pakistan had overshadowed the proceedings.

This emerging

amicable relationship between India and Pakistan raised
hopes about the success of SAARC.
The Islamabad Summit provided the opportunity for the
first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan after
nearly three decades.

The friendly atmosphere of the

Gandhi-Bhutto talks definitely raised public expectations of
future amity between India and Pakistan.

Safdar Mahmood, a

Lahore-based columnist summarized, "the ultimate success of
the SAARC largely depends on the kind of relationship that
develops between India and Pakistan.1,34

THE MALE SUMMIT-1990
The contentious bilateral issues between India and Sri
Lanka led to the cancellation of the 1989 Summit, scheduled
to be held at Colombo.

Sri Lanka formally declared that it

would not hold the Summit as long as the Indian troops

34Quoted in Gupta, 23.
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remained on Sri Lankan soil .35
The fifth Summit was finally held in November 1990 in
Male, the capital of Maldives.

The Summit was held amid

great internal and external turmoil in most of the member
states.

Four of the member states— India, Pakistan, Sri

Lanka and Nepal— had new governments.36

Changes in

government in India and Pakistan coincided with the
worsening of the Kashmir situation.

This Summit like other

SAARC Summits provided the opportunity for talks between the
two rivals.
The Male Declaration called for the extension of the
SAARC activities to the core areas of "economic cooperation,
biotechnology, environmental issues and tourism .”37

The

leaders agreed to observe the 1990s as the "Decade of the
Girl Child” in accordance with the recommendations of the
September 1990 World Summit for Children.38

The member

nations endorsed proposals to create a regional
documentation center in India, a human resources development
center in Pakistan and a tuberculosis treatment center in

35Keesinats Record of World Events. Vol. 36, No. 3
(March 1990), 37357.

36Barbara Crossett, "South Asian Nations in Turmoil Will
Meet,” The New York Times. 21 November 1990, p A7 (L).
37Keesinals Record of World Events. Vol. 36, No. 11
(November 1990), 37857.

38Ibid.
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Nepal .39

In the international field, members criticized

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called for the restoration
of the Kuwaiti Government.40
The first meeting of the newly appointed Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan, Chandrasekhar and Nawaz
Sharif, received maximum press coverage.

The leaders met

for talks at Male and agreed to hold further talks at the
ministerial level in December.41 However the Male meetings
of the two powers did not lead to any treaties or other
formal negotiations.

The Male Summit went off as scheduled

but without any outstanding achievement.

CONCLUSION
A review of the first five SAARC Summits make one fact
abundantly clear. Despite the exclusion of bilateral issues
from the scope of the Charter, it is these issues that chart
the difficult course of the SAARC.

These bilateral

relations are dependent on elite rapport.

Hostile relations

between India and Sri Lanka led to the postponement and
finally the cancellation of the Colombo Summit.

The

relation between Indian and Pakistani elites is the
39Ibid.

40Barbara Crossett, "South Asian Leaders Call for Efforts
Against Drugs,” The New York Times. 25 November 1990, p 21
(L).
41K.T.R. Menon, ”Indo-Pak talks from December 18,” The
Times of India. 23 November 1990, 7.
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principle indicator of the success or failure of the of
these Summits.

In Bangalore and Kathmandu, Indo-Pakistani

strife reflected itself in every aspect of the proceedings
whereas the close rapport between the elites of the two
nations in Islamabad, led to a relatively amicable Summit.
The viability of the SAARC rests on the solution of
bilateral political conflicts among SAARC members,
especially India and Pakistan.

While the SAARC Summits are

often overshadowed by simultaneously held bilateral talks,
one cannot deny the importance of these talks.

These

bilateral negotiations are extremely important and may
ultimately lead to the solution of long-standing political
problems.

The Summits provide the much-needed vehicle for

the leaders to meet and communicate at regular intervals in
a diplomatic atmosphere.

The growing necessity and the

importance of these annual Summits cannot be denied.

CONCLUSION

In 1985, the institutionalization of regional
cooperation in South Asia in the form of the SAARC received
accolades all over the world.

The main objective of the

SAARC is socio-economic development of the poverty-stricken
South Asian region.

Another important objective is the

promotion of mutual trust among the often feuding South
Asian states.

However, the functioning of the SAARC over

the past years has shown that it is difficult to promote
socio-economic cooperation among states with long-standing
political disputes reinforced by antagonistic relations
among the ruling elites of the member states.
The theoretical framework laid out in the first chapter
argues that at the formative stages of any organization for
regional cooperation, politics will play a major role.

At

the onset, political cooperation is necessary to create the
environment necessary for economic cooperation.

Once

economic cooperation is firmly established, these economic
relations may prevent further political discord.

Scholars

like Karl Deutsch, Jacob Viner, Robert Gilpin, Constantine
Vaitsos, Mohammed Ayoob and Partha Ghosh have all stressed
the importance of political factors in the success or
82
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failure of regional cooperation.

Political cooperation

essentially means rapport among the regional elite.

This

rapport depends on similar political perspectives and common
threat perceptions.
Regional cooperation in South Asia developed over a
number of years.

Since the end of colonial rule, regional

leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, espoused regional
cooperation for the development of South Asia.

The mistrust

generated by the Partition and the advent of Cold War
politics, however led to a widening of the rift among the
regional elites.

This elite antagonism, a result of the

absence of common political and strategic perspectives,
proved to be the principal barrier to development of
regional cooperation in South Asia.
The success of the 1980 Bangladesh Proposal was a
result of the consensus among the regional elites for the
formation of a body to promote regional cooperation.
However, a point to be kept in mind is that both India and
Pakistan accepted this Proposal very reluctantly, though it
was endorsed eagerly by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal
and Sri Lanka.
The discord among the elites prevalent in South Asia
is augmented by and reflected in the presence of numerous
bilateral disputes.

These contentious bilateral issues have

made for bitter relations among the regional elites.
from its very inception the SAARC has been extremely

Hence,
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politicized.

Different political perspectives, generated

initially by Partition, are reinforced by the presence of
bilateral disputes.

The Indocentric nature of South Asia

gives rise to the fear of Indian hegemony over the region on
the part of the smaller states.

This Indophobia,

fortified by the existence of the various bilateral
disputes, has generated mistrust among the regional elite
and every Indian move (action or inaction) is viewed with
suspicion.
The relationship between India and Pakistan is of
primary importance.

It is this relationship which holds the

key to the success of the SAARC.

A review of the SAARC

summit proceedings reveals that the Indo-Pakistani
relationship affects the success or failure of these summits
directly.

The Summits at Bangalore (1986) and the Kathmandu

(1987) suffered from the confrontations between the members
of the two delegations.

The Islamabad Summit (1988), marked

by a close rapport between the Indian and the Pakistani
contingent, was the most successful SAARC Summit to date.
The relationship between bilateral disputes and the
lack of elite harmony can be easily discerned from the study
of the political relations in South Asia.

Mutual

understanding and trust among the elites have been conducive
for the socio-economic development within the region.

The

rapport between the Indian government under Mrs. Indira
Gandhi and the regime of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman of Bangladesh
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is one example.

Indian help in the 1971 War of Liberation

in East Pakistan helped in the creation of Bangladesh.

This

infant nation was nurtured by India in the early years of
its existence.

Indo-Bangladesh cooperation extended to many

fields including trade, commerce, industry and others.
After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, IndoBangladesh relations deteriorated rapidly.

Mrs. Gandhi's

antipathy towards the post-Mujib regimes was reflected in
her apprehensions about the efficacy of the SAARC.
A more recent example of elite rapport and its effects
on cooperation in South Asia can be seen in the Indo-Sri
Lankan relations over the Tamil issue.

Initial suspicions

and allegations of Indian support for the LTTE made by the
Jayawardene Government soon gave way to mutual understanding
leading to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in
1987.

By 1989, however, this elite harmony had

disintegrated.

The Goverment of newly elected President

Premadasa resented the presence of the IPKF and demanded the
withdrawal of all Indian troops.

This demand antagonized

the Indian Government and soon a confrontational situation
developed which ultimately led to the cancellation of the
1989 SAARC Summit scheduled to be held in Colombo, the
capital of Sri Lanka.
In the regional relations of South Asia, the primacy of
political relations over economic relations is quite
apparent.

The Partition of the country, tore apart the
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well-integrated economy of British India.

Political and

strategic considerations forced the elites of the newly
created states to shun interdependence and seek to build
independent economies.

The complementary nature of the

regional economies was deliberately severed by the elite for
political reasons.

At present, political discord prevents

the implementation of schemes which are economically
beneficial to the SAARC members.

The proposed Ganges water

sharing scheme between Bangladesh, India and Nepal is a good
example.

The hydro-power potential of such a scheme could

help solve the energy crisis in the region and abate the
growing dependence on foreign oil.

But political concerns

prevent the implementation of this hydro-power project.

The

reluctance exhibited by the Indian Government to accept the
scheme shows that economic benefits are subordinated to
political necessities.
At present, the SAARC is functioning more as a forum
for diplomatic activity than as an actual body promoting
cooperation.

SAARC activities, burdened by regional

political disputes, remain low-keyed.

The future of the

SAARC rests precariously on elite rapport especially on the
relationship between India and Pakistan.

An increase in

political conflicts within the region exacerbates the
prevailing mistrust and weighs down the activities and
functioning of the SAARC.
The fruitful development of regional cooperation
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depends primarily on political cooperation stemming from
rising levels of rapport among the regional elite as in the
case of the Islamabad Summit.

The South Asian case study

clearly shows that it is the presence or absence of
understanding among the regional elites which increases or
decreases the level of cooperation.

The presence of a

harmonious political environment encourages the development
of socio-economic development within a region.

Political

cooperation is an indispensable pre-condition for the
success of regional economic cooperation, and ultimately,
regional integration.

APPENDIX A
CHARTER OF THE SOUTH ASIAN
ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
We, the Heads of State or Government of BANGLADESH, BHUTAN,
INDIA, MALDIVES, NEPAL, PAKISTAN and SRI LANKA:
1. Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and
progress in the region through strict adherence to the
principles of the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER and NON-ALIGNMENT,
particularly respect for the principles of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non
use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of
other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes;
2. Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world,
the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice and
economic prosperity are best achieved in the SOUTH ASIAN
region by fostering mutual understanding, good neighborly
relations and meaningful cooperation among the Member States
which are bound by ties of history and culture;
3. Aware of the common problems, interests and aspirations
of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and the need for joint action
and enhanced cooperation within their respective political
and economic systems and cultural traditions;
4. Convinced that regional cooperation among the countries
of SOUTH ASIA is mutually beneficial, desirable and
necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the
quality of life of the peoples of the region;
5. Convinced further that economic, social and technical
cooperation among the countries of SOUTH ASIA would
contribute significantly to national and collective selfreliance;
6 . Recognising that increased cooperation, contacts and
exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute
to the promotion of friendship and understanding among their
peoples;

7. Recalling the DECLARATION signed by their Foreign
Ministers in NEW DELHI on August 2, 1983 and noting the
progress achieved in regional cooperation;
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8. Reaffirming their determination to promote such
cooperation within an institutional framework;
DO HEREBY
AGREE to establish an organisation to be known as SOUTH
ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION hereinafter
referred to as the ASSOCIATION with the following
objectives, principles, institutional and financial
arrangements:
ARTICLE I
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the ASSOCIATION shall be:(a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of SOUTH ASIA and
to improve their quality of life;
(b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region and to provide all
individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to
realise their full potentials;
(c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among
the countries of SOUTH ASIA;
(d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and
appreciation of one another's problems;
(e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in
the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific
fields;
(f) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in
international forums on matters of common interests; and
(g) to cooperate with international and regional
organisations with similar aims and purposes.
ARTICLE II
PRINCIPLES
1. Cooperation within the framework of the ASSOCIATION shall
be based on respect for the principles of sovereign
equality 7 territorial integrity, political independence,
non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and
mutual benefits.
2. Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral
and multilateral obligations.
ARTICLE III
MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT
The Heads of State or Government shall meet once a year or
more often as and when considered necessary by the member
States.
ARTICLE IV
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
A Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers
of the Member States shall be established with the following
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functions ?
(a) formulation of the policies of the ASSOCIATION;
(b) review of the progress of cooperation under the
ASSOCIATION;
(c) decision on new areas of cooperation?
(d) establishment of additional mechanism under the
ASSOCIATION as deemed necessary;
(e) decision on other matters of general interest to the
ASSOCIATION.
The Council of Ministers shall meet twice a year.
Extraordinary session of the Council may be held by
agreement among the Member States.
ARTICLE V
STANDING COMMITTEE
The Standing Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries
shall have the following functions?
(a) overall monitoring and coordination of programme of
cooperation?
(b) approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities
of their financing?
(c) determination of inter-sectoral priorities?
(d) mobilisation of regional and external resources;
(e) identification of new areas of cooperation based on
appropriate studies.
The Standing Committee shall meet as often as deemed
necessary.
The Standing Committee shall submit periodic reports to the
Council of Ministers and make reference to it as and when
necessary for decisions on policy matters.
ARTICLE VI
TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
Technical Committees comprising representatives of Member
States shall be responsible for the implementation,
coordination and monitoring of the programmes in their
respective areas of cooperation.
They shall have the following terms and reference:
(a) determination of the potential and scope of regional
cooperation in agreed areas?
(b) formulation of programmes and preparation of projects?
(c) determination of financial implications of sectoral
programmes ?
(d) formulation of recommendations regarding apportionment
costs;
(e) implementation and coordination of sectoral programmes?
(f) monitoring of progress in implementation.
The Technical Committee shall submit periodic reports to the
Standing Committee.
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The Chairmanship of the Technical Committees shall rotate
among Member States in alphabetical order every two
years.
The Technical Committees may, inter-alia, use the following
mechanisms and modalities, if and when considered necessary:
(a) meetings of heads of national technical agencies;
(b) meetings of experts in specific fields:
(c) contact amongst recognised centres of excellence in the
region.
ARTICLE VII
ACTION COMMITTEES
The Standing Committee may set up Action Committees
comprising Member States concerned with the implementation
of projects involving more than two but not all Member
States.
ARTICLE VIII
SECRETARIAT
There shall be a Secretariat of the ASSOCIATION.
ARTICLE IX
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
1) The contribution of each Member State towards financing
of the activities of the ASSOCIATION shall be voluntary.
2) Each Technical Committee shall make recommendations for
the apportionment of costs of implementing the programmes
proposed by it.
3) In case sufficient financial resources cannot be
mobilised within the region for funding activities of the
ASSOCIATION, external financing from appropriate sources may
be mobilised with the approval of or by the Standing
Committee.
ARTICLE X
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of
unanimity.
Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the
deliberations.
IN FAITH WHEREOF We Have Set Out Hands And Seals Hereunto.
DONE IN DHAKA, BANGLADESH, On This The Eighth Day of
December Of The Year One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Five.
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